SCALIA, HAMDAN AND THE PRINCIPLES OF SUBJECT MATTER RECUSAL

Abstract

The point of judicial recusal is at once obvious and elusive.  The idea of a partial judge immediately grates on our sense of fairness.  Almost invariably, the normative basis of judicial impartiality is traced to what is described as ‘natural justice’;1 specifically the celebrated maxims of nemo iudex in causa sua2 and audi alteram partem.3  But the relationship of this moral bedrock to the exigencies and settled practices of constitutional adjudication is far from straightforward.  This article will focus on the implications of the latter principle – perhaps best translated as a standard of judicial open-mindedness regarding the subject matter of a dispute.  Despite its moral immediacy, there are serious theoretical objections, best described as ‘realist,’ to an expansive conception of judicial open-mindedness.  Likewise, at a practical level, the institution of the dissenting opinion can be seen as diluting the duty to keep an open mind, at least in jurisdictions such as the US where judges are expected to exhibit relatively little deference towards previous decisions in which they were outvoted.